A Cure for Poverty? The indigent depressed are among the most disabled population in the country. Depression is the consequence of constitutional vulnerability activated by psychosocial stress; in the most significantly traumatized population, simply put, you don’t have to have much predisposing vulnerability at all to become depressed. The author contends that depression, in a sense, “hides in plain sight” in our lower socioeconomic strata. It may be harder to recognize dysfunction; there is often no previous higher level of functioning from which to decline. Helplessness is endemic and fate passively accepted.
This has led a small movement of therapists to advocate extremely assertive treatment, “pressing insight into them, often through muscular exhortation.” The simple labelling of the affliction — “to be given the idea of depression is to master a socially powerful linguistic tool” — can be transformative. Medication might be an expeditious addition to such assertive outreach but the proper recipients are less likely to be identified, and it is less likely to be taken consistently, as it must to be effective, without immediately observable effect, or to be continued after relief is gained.
Advocates of such assertive treatment take the position that “people whose condition can be
improved through treatment should receive it whether they want to or not. It is
their view that those who resist treatment place an unconscionable and
unnecessary burden on society.” The author contends that the disorders that receive coerced treatment are the “noisy” ones, notably schizophrenia and mania, where social disruption occurs. I don’t think it’s exactly their “noisiness” that’s determinative, but rather the fact that we think the capacity for insight, including the ability to recognize that one is ill, and the judgment to seek treatment, are palpably impaired by the brain process in these illnesses. The mental health and judicial systems are generally comfortable coercing treatment when, as a result of such a process, a danger to the patient herself or others is posed.
At the other extreme are literal civil libertarians whose position is that treatment should never be coerced.With nonpsychotic illnesses such as depression, unless the person poses a threat we usually feel they have an absolute right to the freedom to choose not to be treated. But perhaps the dividing line is arbitrary. Nonpsychotic illnesses such as severe depression also impair insight into need for treatment and the wherewithal to seek it; is it cruel to leave them untreated? New York Times Magazine