Commanders from the 1991 Gulf War say the Pentagon has deviated from expectations by advancing with fewer troops. With the Pentagon rushing thousands of soldiers from Texas to the Persian Gulf, a number of 1991 Gulf War ground commanders said Monday that the U.S. invasion force moving rapidly to Baghdad is too small and should have included at least one additional heavy Army division.
“In my judgment, there should have been a minimum of two heavy divisions and an armored cavalry regiment on the ground. That’s how our doctrine reads,” said retired Army Gen. Barry McCaffrey, who commanded the 24th Mechanized Infantry Division during the 1991 Gulf War.
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McCaffrey’s comments are part of a heated debate among current and former ground commanders and strategists about a war plan built upon the concept of a “rolling start,” in which combat actions begin before the arrival of all ready forces, which are then brought forward or held back, depending upon how the battle proceeds.The Wichita Eagle Every media piece second-guessing the military strategists hastens to add, however, and in almost identical language, that the “ultimate outcome is not in doubt,” only how long it will take. I wonder…
Related: Mark Kleiman raises some interesting “questions from a non-specialist” and, in doing, displays a deeper incertitude similar to my own:
1. To what extent were war plans, and especially the relative economy of ground forces, shaped by overoptimism about the prospects for a coup, mass Iraqi defections/surrenders, and uprisings in support of the liberating forces? I know Barry McCaffrey has been complaining about this. Is he right?
2. Were the troops in the field given overoptimistic views of the likely reaction of the enemy? (There have been several reports of US soldiers surprised that the Iraqis were fighting back.)
3. If there was overoptimism, to what extent was it shaped by a White House intolerant of bearers of bad tidings?
What strikes me as odd is that the very same people who described SH’s rule as “Stalinist” — which seems to be a good description — also expected the regime to fold quickly in the face of an attack. That never really added up. Does the name “Stalingrad” ring a bell?
Phil Carter, an ex-military officer whose weblog, Intel Dump, is attracting a fair bit of attention, answers here. In part:
Mark, you may be eerily prescient. Stalin was undoubtedly a more evil tyrant than Saddam Hussein, but the Soviet people fought for him anyway. Why? Largely because World War II was a war of national survival for the Russian people. This kind of war mobilizes people to fight in a way like no other. America believed after Pearl Harbor that it was fighting WWII as such a war, and thus no cost was too high. We did not feel the same way in Vietnam; our enemies did. Israel’s performance in the Golan Heights in 1973 provides another instructive example of how armies fight in wars of national survival when their back is against the wall. Soldiers and civilians fight hard when they believe in their hearts and minds that their nation, their family, and their way of life is at risk. Whatever atrocities Saddam has inflicted, he has managed to convince his people that they are fighting a war of national survival.
There’s more: “Is the Allied Strategy in Difficulty? The world’s generals give their verdict.” Independent/UK
