Was Arafat the Problem? Those who despair at how far away from the Camp David accords we’ve drifted often conclude that Arafat, in rejecting Ehud Barak’s “so generous” proposals, was never really interested in a negotiated, two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Writing in Slate, Robert Wright (author of The Moral Animal and Nonzero: The Logic of Human Destiny) looks more closely at Arafat’s comportment at Camp David and Taba, and the supposed generosity of the Israeli offers, and finds this position insupportable (although it does appear to hinge abit much on an epiphany of dubious significance he recounts having in a conversation with Jerusalem mayor Teddy Kollek). Arafat’s failing has not been to be too aggressive, Wright says, but to lack the creative vision as a leader to steer his people effectively to a land-for-peace compromise. Succinctly echoed by Mitsu at Synthetic Zero: “What the Palestinians need is either Gandhi or Nelson Mandela. What they have is Zelig” ? By 2000, when Barak had allowed Sharon to visit Haram al-Sharif, igniting the intifada, and it was increasingly clear he would be succeeded by Sharon (and Clinton likewise by the hands-off stance of the Bush administration), it was probably too late.

President Carter writes an op-ed piece in today’s Times that captures the growing sense that Israel must return to its pre-1967 borders as a means to peace. He suggests joint administration of East Jerusalem and ducks the infamous issue of the ‘right of return’ to Palestinian lands inside the borders of Israel. He suggests that the US leverage the Israelis with the threat of withholding aid and enforcing a strict interpretation of the legal requirement that all US arms supplied to Israel be used for strictly defensive purposes. But he sidesteps the issue above of how Arafat might lead the Palestinians to accept less than their most intransigent segment demands, or control the factions that will never accept Israel’s right to exist.