A molecular biologist and former NIH and FDA official asserts that biowar is ‘not the end of the world’: “Biological weapons have an apocalyptic reputation. But they are often ineffective in spreading disease.”

The US Centers for Disease Control in Atlanta, which tracks such incidents, recorded 109 laboratory-associated infections during 1947-73 but not a single secondary case – that is, the infection of a patient’s family member or community contact. Similarly, the medical literature reveals only a handful of persons secondarily infected.

It is also instructive to look at the occurrence of anthrax in industrial settings. Historically, workers involved with certain animal products were at the highest risk but only 18 cases of inhalational anthrax were reported in the US from 1900 to 1978. Human-to-human transmission of anthrax has never been reported. As a public health threat, most biological agents act much like a toxic chemical such as the sarin released in the Tokyo subway by terrorists, with injury limited primarily to those exposed initially.

The Financial Times

If this is true, it’s the first reassuring thing I can believe about the specter of biological terrorism. In contrast, my longstanding habit of being unable to trust either the candor or the adequacy of the assessment behind statements from our government has never before distressed me as much as my current lack of confidence in reassurances such as these: ‘Health and Human Services Secretary Tommy Thompson believes the United States is prepared to take care of any kind of biological attack. In an interview with 60 Minutes‘ Mike Wallace, Thompson said, “We’ve got to make sure that people understand that they’re safe.” Thompson said eight staging areas around America are each stocked with 50 tons of medical supplies that can be moved within hours to the site of any bioterrorist attack.’ CBS News